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Area or Country (s)	Organiza-	General	Specific	Doc. Date
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000300090031-8				Class.: S
Hdqtrs	OSO	FI	Liaison (inter-office)	12 and 2
	OCD ✓			March
				1947
			25X1A	

**Identification of Document:**

Two memoranda: Cf. Control [REDACTED] for ADSO, Subj: Control and OCD; 2pp. - ADSO to DDCI, Subj: CIG Procedure for processing Requests for Intelligence Information; 2pp.

**Abstract Notation References:**

Reflects adjustment of collection activities and liaison with OCD. In the first instance recommends that OCD have only one point of contact in OSO, namely [REDACTED] office.

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In the second memo recommends that OSO deal with ORE in receipt of collection requirements rather than with Collection Branch of OCD. This would allow ORE to determine what part of requirement has already been satisfied through overt sources or collections.

Document Location:  
Wash-CIA-AD-18 folder 21

RC Job Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000300090031-8

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6.07

12 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

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Subject: Control and OGD

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1. For several months now Control has been dealing with OGD, and, step by step, Control now finds itself in the position of handling all requests between the various customers for intelligence material in Special Operations and OGD. I was not present at the meetings when the functions of Control vis-a-vis OGD were agreed upon, but I understand that [REDACTED] requested that all requests to be made of OGD for intelligence material should come from one office. It was apparently decided that Control should be the contact point with OGD for Special Operations. I believe the thinking was that Control was supposed to screen the various requests, see to it that there were no duplicate requests for the same material, turn down unreasonable or vague requests and, in general, act as a clearing house for all intelligence material desired by the various branches of Special Operations.

2. At the present time, about 90% of the intelligence material requested of Control could be classified as routine, in the sense that publications, manuals, lists, and other printed or mimeographed material is desired. Apparently, Control is also expected to follow up all these requests and, in addition, see to it that material procured on a loan basis is returned at the proper time.

3. Recently OGD has been sending material to Control "spontaneously." This represents material for which no specific request has been made but which OGD considers might be of interest to Special Operations. This leaves Control with a dissemination function. We usually simply pass this material on to Mr. Houck for dissemination.

4. An increasing flood of requests for intelligence material has been arriving in Control and this flood is bound further to increase. This places a great burden upon Control in the way of logging in and out, identifying material, following up requests, and, in many other ways, endeavoring to see to it that the flow back and forth is uninterrupted and expedited.

5. I fail to see how this service is a proper one of the Control office. It seems to me that the customer for the material should deal directly with OGD. I believe that [REDACTED] office should receive 25X1A from the various branches all requests for intelligence material and should deal directly with OGD on them. It is not my feeling that the Control office should have a collection and dissemination function—

*Retain or Destroy*

which it certainly now has under the present set-up. I do not think that Control performs any useful function but is, rather, an additional bottleneck. It takes the full time of one person in the Control office to handle all this paper and printed material in which Control has no interest. This results in inevitable delays and, I believe, is nothing more or less than a bureaucratic function which has no utility whatsoever.

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6. It is my recommendation that [REDACTED] office in Special Operations be charged with dealing directly with OCP in all matters relating to intelligence material, and that Control be relieved from this unnecessary function.

[REDACTED]  
Control

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MEMORANDUM TO THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CID

Subject: CID Procedure for Processing Requests for Intelligence Information.

1. Reference is made to memorandum of 21 March 1947 to Assistant Director for Special Operations, from [redacted] G.S.C. (FA), 25X1A9a Chief, Collection Branch, subject: "Molotov Automobile Factory", which is attached. The attached paper is referred to you with the hope of arriving at a more efficient system of processing requests for intelligence information to this office and with the hope of correcting a procedure which is regarded as basically unsound. This paper is an example of many similar requests that have been received by this office from the Office of Collection and Dissemination, simultaneously requesting this office and overt collection agencies to obtain the same information. From the point of view of economy of effort and sound operating procedure, it is believed that generally a file search by appropriate intelligence agencies and all overt collection means should be exhausted to obtain any intelligence information desired before this office is asked to undertake collection by clandestine means. The resources of OSO are necessarily limited and should be expended normally only to obtain important intelligence information that is not already available in files or that it is impossible for overt collection agencies to obtain. To explore possibilities and to plan and mount a specific operation to obtain information, assuming that the project is deemed sufficiently important and is within the capabilities of this organization, is time consuming, expensive, and often very difficult. Obviously, there is no point in undertaking such an operation provided the information desired can be obtained by other means.

2. If a request for intelligence information implies only a file check by OSO locally or at appropriate overseas stations, the request for information should so state clearly; otherwise it must be assumed that an operation is to be undertaken and it is again reiterated that an operation should not be undertaken until all overt collection possibilities have been exhausted. In this connection, all information collected by OSO is sent to ORE and normally ORE can be requested for a file check. To ask OSO and overt collecting agencies for the same information simultaneously will result in such situations as occurred recently at one location when the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, and an OSO representative received simultaneously from Washington requests for the same information. This would not appear to be a coordinated collection effort.

3. The present procedure referred to above would seem to relieve ORE of any responsibility for establishing requirements for intelligence information. It is my understanding that ORE has this responsibility.

(Original not routed  
[redacted])

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Generally when requests for intelligence information are received by OCD from outside intelligence agencies, or from within CIG except from ORE, the following procedure is recommended for consideration:

- (a) Send the request for intelligence information to ORE to find out what part of the information is already available within CIG and to get the guidance of ORE for further collection.
- (b) Then request a file search and collection from appropriate overt collecting agencies.
- (c) If the information is unobtainable from files or by overt collection, then request OSO to undertake collection provided the matter is of sufficient importance to so warrant.

4. Since ORE has the responsibility of determining overall intelligence information requirements for CIG, it might be well to consult ORE concerning the importance of the information desired before it is submitted to OSO for a collection effort. Requests should also indicate priority and be specific; although the example attached is specific, most of those received are not. Exceptions could well be made to the above procedure when the information desired is of such great urgency and importance that simultaneous collection by overt agencies and OSO might be warranted; also when the information desired is obviously unobtainable from the files of ORE and other intelligence agencies and obviously impossible of collection by overt means. However, it is believed that usually it will be impossible to make such determinations except by conducting a file search and requesting overt collection.

5. OSO is now in the process of attempting to meet current demands for our customers for intelligence information that can only be collected by clandestine means and at the same time attempting to build up a high-level, long-term covert intelligence organization. The considerations presented above are not made in any spirit of attempting to shirk responsibility for the job for which OSO is designed, but rather in the spirit of permitting this office to concentrate on its principal missions and not waste its effort on collection activities which can better be handled by other collecting agencies.

Assistant Director  
Special Operations

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